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Azerbaijan’s current fiscal stance is quite strong; however, 
this stability is completely based on oil-related revenues. In 
the  meantime,  the  situation  with  alternative  sources  of 
fiscal  revenues  is  uncertain.  A  large  part  of  fiscal 
management  is  built  on  opacity  and  an  assessment  of 
budget spending efficiency has never been done. It is likely 
that  Azerbaijan  will  only  be  able  to  maintain  its  fiscal 
stability through the next ten years or so, i.e. until the end 
of  the  active  oil-extraction  period.  In  the  more  distant 
future, a substantial fiscal correction will be necessary.  
 Disturbing tendencies 
The general fiscal position of Azerbaijan is quite sustainable 
in the mid-term perspective. However, the long-term future 
does not look too brilliant. Over the last few years, several 
disturbing tendencies have been observed. In particular, it is 
important  to  highlight  at  least  five  of  these  challenges, 
which should be closely monitored and analyzed: 
The first important point is the steady growth of the non-oil 
budget  deficit.  Azerbaijan  heavily  subsidizes  the  state 
budget  from  the  State  Oil  Fund  (nearly  60%  of  budget 
revenues). In addition, close to 15% of its own state budget 
collections are oil-related revenues. All in all more than 2/3 
of public spending rely on hydrocarbons. Though this has 
been  a  problem  for  many  years,  recently  it  has  gotten 
worse. For the last five years, the non-oil fiscal gap almost 
doubled from 19.1% GDP in 2008 to 32.0% GDP in 2012. 
And this trend had been developing against the approaching 
end of the oil boom. So far the problem is not critical since 
the  State  Oil  Fund  of  Azerbaijan  (SOFAZ)  has  impressive 
assets (55.3% of GDP end of 2011). However, over the next 
two decades, the non-oil deficit, which is currently only a 
technical estimate, will become an effective fiscal gap for 
the country. 
The second issue is the size of SOFAZ assets. Though the 
assets are quite large, they will not be enough to balance 
Azerbaijan’s  public  finances  in  the  post-oil  period.  In 
relative terms, the assets accumulated over the last ten 
years by SOFAZ are enough to cover only 1.7 years of 
non-oil deficit
1. Furthermore, over the last two years, 
SOFAZ  slowed  down  accumulating  oil  revenues, 
spending  a  major  part  of  them  on  current  needs.  In 
particular,  in  2011,  SOFAZ  assets  increased  by  only 
29.0%  (after  a 51.8%  increase  a  year earlier)  and  for 
2012, the authorities are aiming for only a timid 0.9% 
assets’ growth. Overall, between 2001 and 2011, SOFAZ 
accumulated in the form of assets about USD 7.1 bn less 
than it spent for the same period of time. If the current 
tendency  continues,  one  can  expect  to  see  a  strong 
fiscal correction in Azerbaijan at the end of the active oil 
extraction period (provisionally after 2024
2). 
The  third  challenge  is  related  to  the  growing 
dependence  of  re-current  spending,  again,  with  oil-
related  earnings.  Although  the  authorities  declared 
their  intention  to  use  oil  money  only  for  investment 
needs, through the last years a large part of oil-related 
funds  was  allocated  for  re-current  spending.  In 
particular, by 2012, less than 50% of consolidated re-
current  spending  was  covered  from  non-oil  fiscal 
collections.  At  the  same  time,  the  rest  is  now 
dependent on hydrocarbon proceeds. 
The fourth concern is the lack of transparency of public 
debt management and quasi-fiscal activities. It is very 
likely  that  public  debt  is  not  a  problem  given  the 
relatively  high  SOFAZ  assets.  However,  only  limited 
information is publicly available; only data for external 
debt  is  available,  while  internal  debt  and  contingent 
liabilities  are  not  published  openly.  In  such  an 
environment,  public  debt  could  become  a  problem 
quite unexpectedly and no one can guarantee a timely 
                                                             
1 For the non-oil deficit, the general budget oil revenues are 
estimated as the sum of SOFAZ transfers to the budget and tax 
revenues from oil-related activities (less interest return on SOFAZ 
assets). 
2 Country Economic Memorandum -- Staying Focused on 
Diversification, World Bank, 2009.  
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detection  of  risks.  For  example,  in  2011  debt  servicing 
costs  increased  sharply  (almost  quadrupling  from  $118 
mn  to  $445  mn),  which  indirectly  signaled  the  rapid 
accumulation of debt stock. Still the sum is probably not 
critical – but it is only an assumption (as we have no data). 
A similar situation is observed with quasi-fiscal activities. 
Azerbaijan has one of the largest quasi-fiscal activities in 
the region (43.3% of budget spent on economic activities 
in  2011,  which  are  mainly  state  investment  projects); 
however,  developments  in  this  realm  are  hardly 
transparent. The reports about the performance of state 
enterprises, if available, are quite general. 
 Comparative table on key fiscal indictors, 2010-2012  
 
1 Defined as central budget, budget of Nakhchivan AR and Social 
Protection Fund. 
2 Oil-related earnings include SOFAZ transfer to the budget and tax 
revenues from oil-related activities (less interest return on SOFAZ assets). 
Source: Own estimates based on data from the State Statistical 
Committee of Azerbaijan (actual GDP), Finance Ministry of Azerbaijan and 
SOFAZ (fiscal data), and Ministry of Economic Development of Azerbaijan 
projections and estimates (GDP in 2011–2012). 
Finally, it is not clear what will be the source of tax 
collections after the end of the active oil extraction 
period. According to the World Bank
3, Azerbaijan only 
has sufficient oil and gas deposits until 2024 and, to 
make matters worse, the majority of the deposits has 
been  already  extracted.  This  situation  promises 
economic stagnation followed by a gradual decline in 
oil  earnings,  while  the  perspectives  for  alternative 
budget revenues are not clear. Furthermore, the very 
definition  of  the  non-oil  sector  that  the  Statistics 
Office  of  Azerbaijan  uses  is  rather  embellished:  for 
instance,  the  transportation  sector  is  treated  as  a 
non-oil sector while more than 80% of cargo turnover 




                                                             
3 Country Economic Memorandum -- Staying Focused on 
Diversification, World Bank, 2009. 
    2010  2011  2012 
General government
1 deficit   % GDP  3.0  3.6  4.3 
Net general government deficit (excluding all oil-
related earnings
2)  % GDP  21.5  29.8  32.0 
Net general government deficit , excluding capital 
transfers  % GDP  9.4  11.2  13.7 
         
General government revenues  % GDP  30.2  39.8  41.2 
General government expenditures  % GDP  33.2  43.4  45.4 
Transfer from SOFAZ  % GDP  14.2  21.7  22.8 
Net balance of Social Protection Fund (excluding 
transfer from the state budget and revenues from 
the enterprises financed from the state budget) 
% GDP  -1.6  -2.1  -2.4 
Re-current spending  % GDP  16.0  18.2  20.0 
Capital spending  % GDP  12.1  18.6  18.2 
         
SOFAZ assets 




2.0  1.9  1.7 
Return on SOFAZ assets  %  1.3  2.2  - 
         
Revenues structure         
Total oil revenues  67.5  71.5  73.2 
Non-oil revenues 
% of total 
revenues  32.5  28.5  26.8 
         
Spending structure         
National economy  41.6  43.3  40.5 
Social protection 
% of total 
revenues  9.5  10.1  10.5  
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Preventing a slump 
Although the fiscal accounts of Azerbaijan are signaling 
serious challenges, oil money makes these challenges 
only hypothetical at this stage. However, as the World 
Bank points out, the country does not have that much 
time to enjoy its hydrocarbon earnings. The authorities 
of Azerbaijan should act quickly to prepare for the day 
when  the  estimated  non-oil  deficit  will  become  the 
effective fiscal gap. The following should be among the 
first-order actions: 
1)  a  strategy  for  non-oil  deficit  management  (with 
clear  targets  for  the  deficit  in  the  post-oil  period 
and a clear plan for reducing the non-oil deficit to a 
secure level beforehand); 
2)  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  non-oil  sector  and  a 
system for monitoring non-oil sector development 
(with a potential state program for non-oil sector 
development); 
3)  an  efficiency  assessment  of  quasi-fiscal  activities 
(with  a  possible  revision  of  some  quasi-fiscal 
programs); 
4)  a  strategy  for  public  debt  management  (with  the 
targets and limits for the post-oil period). 
As the country has more than a decade to go before it 
runs  out  of  oil,  Azerbaijan  still  has  time  to  revise  its 
approach  to  fiscal  risks  and  develop  an  efficient  set  of 
tools to deal with the outlined problems. At this stage, the 
country  can  still  avoid  pitfalls  and  create  reliable 






















































This  E-Brief  summarises  the  results  of  a  one  week 
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